Abstract: There are two primary treatment alternatives available to those with mild to moderate depression or anxiety: psychotherapy and medication. The medical literature and our analysis suggests that in many cases psychotherapy, or a combination of therapy and medication, is more curative than medication alone. However, few individuals choose to use psychotherapy. We develop and estimate a dynamic model in which individuals make sequential medical treatment and labor supply decisions while jointly managing mental health and human capital. The results shed light on the relative importance of several drawbacks to psychotherapy that explain patients' reluctance to use it: (1) therapy has high time costs, which vary with an individual's opportunity cost of time and flexibility of the work schedule; (2) therapy is less standardized than medication, which results in uncertainty about it's productivity for a given individual; and (3) therapy is expensive. The estimated model is used to simulate the impacts of counterfactual policies that alter the costs associated with psychotherapy.
Introduction
Economists view health as a form of human capital that has the potential to improve an individual's longevity, quality of life, and productivity at work (Grossman, 1972 ). An implication is that medical treatment can be viewed as a costly investment. The Grossman (1972) framework has been widely applied in economics to understand how patients make medical decisions by weighing the costs and benefits of different medical treatments. It has also been extended to incorporate other features linked to healthcare decision-making, including learning and uncertainty about drug quality, side effects of highly effective treatments and links to labor market decisions and outcomes. Surprisingly, existing work has rarely applied the Grossman model to mental health. This is troubling since nearly one in five adults in the US experiences mental illness in a given year, the most common being mild to moderate anxiety or depression.
1 Moreover, mental health problems are consistently associated with poor labor market outcomes, including lower productivity, absenteeism and disability, which seems to suggest that mental health (like physical health) should be analyzed as a form of human capital. One reason for this gap in the literature amounts to measurement problems surrounding sources of mental health issues, diagnosis and the impact of treatment, the latter posing a formidable empirical challenge due to selection bias, as we document below. Moreover, data limitations make it difficult to relate mental health, treatment and labor market outcomes. Another unfortunate reason for this gap is that mental health problems-perhaps due to widespread stigma or a general lack of understanding-are often seen as fundamentally different from physical health problems. The implicit suggestion seems to be that rational choice, applied in a wide variety of medical contexts, is somehow inappropriate for an analysis of mental healthcare. Indeed, parity laws that put mental health treatments on the same footing as physical health treatments for purposes of insurance design are only only now becoming the norm in the U.S. 2 In our view, an understanding of patient medical decision-making is necessary to evaluate both the effectiveness and welfare consequence of healthcare or labor market policies that would affect mental health. We therefore aim to fill this gap in the literature.
In this paper, we study the relationships between mental health conditions, treatment alternatives, and labor market outcomes, with a focus on treatment decisions for individuals with mild to moderate depression or anxiety. Two empirical patterns drive our approach. First, there are well-established and strong links between mental health problems, labor 1 According to the National Alliance on Mental Illness, as of 2011, antidepressants were the most consumed class of drugs in the United States at roughly 260 million prescriptions per year, generating nearly $20 billion in revenues annually (Mojtabai and Olfson, 2014) .
2 Variation in this legislation is helpful for the estimation of causal effects of treatment.
supply and productivity. Thus, it would be difficult to understand mental health treatment decisions without incorporating how they relate to labor supply decisions and labor market outcomes. Indeed, as we will show, an important downside of therapy is its time costs, which are especially salient for employed workers. Second and related: patients rarely choose therapy, which is often the most effective treatment. Of the two dominant treatment options, pharmaceuticals and psychotherapy, the vast majority of patients rely on pharmaceuticals even though much of the medical literature suggests that talk therapy, or a combination of therapy and medication, may be more effective than medication alone at resolving underlying causes of anxiety and depression (Blackburn et al., 1981; Fava et al., 2014; Kirsch et al., 2008; Hofmann and Smits, 2008; Hollon et al., 2014) . To illustrate this point, Figure 1 shows that the proportion of American adults reporting a mental health issue has nearly doubled in the past 20 years. With the exception of a small increase in attention deficit disorders (ADD), the entirety of this increase is due to increases in depression and anxiety disorders, the illnesses we focus on in this paper. Over the same period of time, the use of psychotherapeutic drugs to treat mental illness has risen substantially (by roughly 50%) while the use of talk therapy has fallen (see Figure 2 ).
3
Given these empirical patterns, a framework that can be used to understand mental health treatment decisions must be able to explain (i) why patients choose less effective treatments and (ii) how these decisions are linked to labor supply decisions and labor market outcomes. To that end, we identify several important drawbacks to talk therapy that explain patients' reluctance to use it. Some of these drawbacks are explicitly related to the labor market. First, therapy is time consuming (Howard et al., 1986) , which is particularly salient for individuals who work many hours, have a high opportunity cost of time, or have less flexible work schedules. Second, therapy is expensive (Frank, Busch, and Berndt, 1998) . Third, therapy poses a mismatch risk in the sense that patients may need to try several therapists before finding one that is effective. Mismatch risk exacerbates already burdensome time costs.
4
Finally, there is social stigma attached to mental illness (Satcher, 2000) , which might make repeated personal interaction with a therapist uncomfortable for some patients. Medication, in contrast, is relatively low-cost in terms of time and money; is a fairly standardized product, which reduces uncertainty; and can be used in private, which helps to dispel stigma concerns. On the other hand, medication may have undesirable side effects (Khawam, Laurencic, and Malone, 2006) and may be more palliative than curative (Hollon et al., 2005) . To fix ideas, 3 More puzzling: the use of drugs has increased despite some evidence suggesting that (i) the most popular type of antidepressant, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), is no more effective than a placebo for a large majority of patients (Kirsch et al., 2008) and (ii) talk therapy is an effective treatment (Stewart and Chambless, 2009; Hofmann and Smits, 2008) . 4 We credit Richard Frank with bringing this downside to our attention.
notice that these tradeoffs could have countervailing effects on the treatment choice that depend on an individual's level of labor market human capital. For example, a high-earning individual may have a stronger incentive to invest in future health, which would add value to talk therapy. However, a high-earner also has a high opportunity cost of time, which could make medication relatively more attractive. The option that an individual ultimately chooses depends on several factors, including: the severity of the mental health condition, current earnings and employment, and the individual's stage in her life-cycle, which influences the dynamic returns to work experience.
To better understand how counterfactual policies could affect treatment choices, mental health and patient welfare, we construct a unified framework that incorporates these various tradeoffs. In particular, we specify and estimate a life-cycle model in which a forwardlooking agent makes sequential treatment and labor market decisions while jointly managing her mental health capital and labor market human capital. To our knowledge there is no prior work that constructs a model that captures the various dynamic tradeoffs driving mental health treatment choices.
5 The estimated model allows us to simulate the effects of counterfactual policies on treatment decisions, mental health, and labor market outcomes over the life-cycle. By incorporating each of the tradeoffs that affects treatment decisions into a single framework, we are able to separate the relative importance of each tradeoff and compare the effects of multiple policies. Possible counterfactual policies evaluated include: (i) subsidizing therapy to reduce pecuniary costs; (ii) lowering the time constraints associated with therapy for those who are employed, including a policy that provides low-skilled workers with the same amount of work flexibility as high-skilled workers; (iii) facilitating information provision or standardizing therapy to reduce uncertainty in therapist choice; (iv) subsidizing therapy for the young; and (v) taking measures to reduce social stigma.
6
In studying mental health treatment choices, we contribute to a massive medical and public health literature on mental health. This literature includes well-developed scholarship on the determinants and consequences of mental health issues, the effectiveness of mental health treatment and predictors of mental health treatment choices. We do not provide an exhaustive review of this literature, but highlight some key results that we incorporate into our framework. Several papers have discussed that treatments are at least somewhat substitutable (Elkin et al., 1989; Berndt, Frank, and McGuire, 1997) and that consumers are price sensitive (Ellis, 1986; Frank and McGuire, 1986; Keeler, Manning, and Wells, 1988) . Moreover, as drugs are less expensive under many insurance plans, another literature explores selection into insurance by the mentally ill (Sturm, Meredith, and Wells, 1996; Deb et al., 1996) . Together, these results could help to explain widespread reliance on drugs. Other papers have discussed the difficulty in estimating the causal impact of treatments, not least because of a formidable selection problem (Lu, 1999; Lang, 2013) . Still others have examined how mental health, treatment and the labor market interact in more reduced form settings (Frank and Gertler, 1991; Ettner, Frank, and Kessler, 1997; Stewart et al., 2003; Greenberg et al., 2003) . Few papers have discussed either mismatch or the time-cost of therapy. Our approach therefore incorporates many of the features from the mental health care literature, but adds some new features that could help to explain observed treatment choice decisions.
A second literature to which we contribute is economic research on medical treatments. Several papers have studied consumer choice under uncertainty both with learning (e.g., Crawford and Shum 2005) and without (e.g., Cronin 2016) in the context of medical treatment. Papageorge (2016) examines how side effects of HIV drugs reduce time in the labor market, which can incentivize patients to avoid effective treatments. Similarly, we study how various drawbacks of effective mental health treatment can lead patients to optimally choose less effective treatments. The difference is not only the context (mental health versus HIV), but also the source of product features that we see as drawbacks. Therapy is costly not because it causes side effects, but because it is time-intensive, fraught with uncertainty and expensive. We incorporate these features into a decision model with the aim of evaluating policies that could mitigate these downsides and possibly shift treatment choices.
Turning to results, our estimated model confirms that (on average) therapy is more productive in improving mental health outcomes than medication; a finding that is consistent with the recent medical literature. Moreover, our findings suggests that time costs, uncertainty of therapy productivity/efficacy, and preferences (potentially related to stigma), in addition to monetary costs, explain the lack of demand for therapy relative to medication. Our findings also suggest that mental illness reduces wage offers and employment, both through lower wages and through lower preferences for work. The costs of therapy are found to be the most salient for the least educated workers, who display the greatest price sensitivity and contend with the least flexible work schedules. To highlight the potential benefits of reducing therapy costs, we conduct two counterfactual policy simulations. The simulations separately reduce the monetary and time costs associated with therapy to zero. As expected, the policies increase therapy use (43% for zero monetary cost and 11% for zero time cost), which improves mental health outcomes and wages offers. More importantly, the policies, which do not intentionally target subpopulations, have the largest impact on individuals with the least education, which reduces existing inequality in medical care provision and income, as this subpopulation has a relatively low rate of therapy use, high rate of mental illness, and low incomes.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the data and provides motivation for the mechanisms in the structural model; Section 3 presents the parameterized model; Section 4 describes estimation, including identification and parameter estimates; Section 5 presents results from counterfactual policy simulations; and Section 6 concludes.
Data
We use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) to estimate the structural model and to explore treatment decisions and mental health production in a reduced form setting. MEPS is a nationally representative survey of families and individuals in the United States. A new cohort of individuals has been added to MEPS annually since 1996, drawn randomly from the previous year's National Health Interview Survey sample. For our analysis we use the 1998-2008 cohorts. Each individual in a cohort is interviewed five times over the course of two years with the time between interviews determined randomly at the individual level.
MEPS is well suited for the estimation of our dynamic model because it includes both multiple observations on the same individuals over time and observations on individuals across the age distribution. The data set includes detailed information on treatment choices, including units consumed, out-of-pocket costs, total costs, and date of treatment, as well as mental health, including both subjective measures and diagnosis. The most important measure of mental health that we extract from the data is subjective. In each interview, the individual is asked, "In general, would you say that (your) mental health is excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor?" Within our model, the desire to seek medical treatment is derived from an underlying desire to improve this measure of mental health. We are also able to determine whether individuals possess specific mental illnesses (e.g., depression, schizophrenia, dementia, etc.) via three-digit ICD-9 Condition Codes, which are extracted during the interview process.
7 The MEPS data also contain rich information on labor market outcomes. Labor market information includes hours worked, wages, and occupation, and demographic information includes education, age, race, gender, and location. Further, MEPS restricted use data identifies an individual's county of residence, which allows us to merge in detailed information on the supply of medical services in an individual's location from the Area Health Resource File. Such information includes, for example, the number of doctors and psychiatrists per capita.
7 Individuals report known illnesses as well as, "health problems (i.e., physical conditions, accidents, or injuries that affect any part of the body as well as mental or emotional health conditions, such as feeling sad, blue, or anxious about something) that may have bothered (them)," over the survey period. Professional coders convert these descriptions into three-digit ICD-9-CM codes, some of which are later verified by medical professionals if treatment is sought.
The Estimation Sample
The following subsections use the entirety of the MEPS data to summarize observed relationships between mental health, treatment choices, human capital, and the labor market. A number of prominent features of the data are highlighted: (1) Our measures of mental health are strongly correlated with age, education, and income. (2) While therapy is less popular than pills for all groups, it is most popular among young, educated individuals. This may suggest that therapy is treated as an investment good. (3) Therapy use is associated with working significantly fewer hours, conditional on mental health status, which is consistent with therapy imposing time costs. (4) The time cost of therapy appears to be strongest for those with less education, which suggests that education may serve as a proxy for the flexibility of an individual's work schedule. (5) Individuals in the worst mental health states are the most likely to seek medical treatment. This suggests that naive estimates of the effect of treatment on mental health are likely to plagued by selection bias. (6) Of those who attend therapy, a sizable mass attend only one session. Moreover, these stand-alone sessions do not seem to be productive, which suggests that individuals may face a risk of mismatch when choosing therapy.
While the full sample from MEPS is available for analysis, the estimation sample for the structural model is restricted to a randomly selected subsample of those individuals who remain in the sample for a full two years and are between the ages of 25 and 60. The restriction to a random subset is simply made to reduce computation time. The restriction to those between 25 and 60 is made as our focus is on individuals for whom education is predetermined and who are making decisions with respect to the labor market. Periods in the structural model are defined as being 6 months in length. Hence, for each individual there are four periods at which decisions are observed. However, for the initial six-month period mental health entering the period is unknown, which results in three six-month periods being available for analysis for each individual. Table 1 details the sample creation process for the structural model, and the number of observations available at each stage. Tables 2, 3 , and 4 provide sample statistics related to mental health and treatment choice. Table 2 presents statistics by age group and shows that depression and anxiety are highly prevalent conditions. Because these statistics are for any given period of six months, the amount of individuals ever suffering from depression or anxiety up to a given age is much higher. On average, as individuals age, subjective mental health worsens, depression and anxiety become more prevalent, and the use of medication increases. Table 2 also highlights that medication is a much more popular treatment choice than talk therapy. Table 3 presents sample means for demographic and labor market variables by treatment choice. The statistics indicate that those individuals who use therapy are younger, more likely to live in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA), and are more highly educated than those who use medication. That those who use therapy are younger and more educated relative to those who use medication supports the possibility that individuals see therapy as an investment in future mental health. Of course, these are unconditional means and those who are younger and more educated differ in many dimensions from those who are older and less educated. Further, those who are more educated may be more likely to take therapy for other reasons. For example, therapy may be more productive for those who are more verbal and those who are more educated may have more flexible work schedules. The structural model will separate multiple channels through which selection into treatment by education might occur. That those who use therapy are more likely to live an MSA relative to those who use medication may be a reflection of differences in the supply of therapists between MSAs and more rural areas, but could also be suggestive of the presence of social stigma and differences in the level of anonymity when attending a therapist in a large city as opposed to in a small town.
Summary Statistics
Finally, Table 4 presents sample means by level of subjective mental health, ranging from excellent mental health, labeled M H = 5, to poor mental health, labeled M H = 1. Here, we see that those with poor mental health are more likely to be female, older, less educated, and have lower wages relative to those with better mental health. As expected, worse subjective mental health is associated with depression, anxiety, and the use of treatment.
Treatment Choices
To consider whether treatment choices are consistent with the mechanisms being modeled, we estimate a multinomial logit of treatment choice on the sample of individuals who consume medical care. The mutually exclusive alternatives are medication only, therapy only, and both medication and therapy. Medication only is the base category. Treatment choices are modeled as a function of age, education, hours worked, interactions of hours worked with education, hourly wages, and demographic characteristics. The model conditions on an individual's subjective mental health to account for the possibility that human capital, labor supply, and wages are correlated with both mental health and treatment choices. Table 5 presents the estimated parameters.
The results indicate that conditional on level of mental health, employment variables, and demographics, those who are younger and more educated are more likely to use therapy or a combination relative to pills alone. 8 As noted above, a correlation between education and therapy could be due to (1) higher future earnings making investments in future mental health more attractive, (2) therapy being more productive for those who are more educated, or (3) differences in work flexibility or earnings for high and low individuals. Because the model conditions on hourly wages, hours worked, and the interaction of hours worked with level of education, the coefficient on education levels should mostly consist of (1) and (2). The structural model separates these two channels. Adding to the evidence from Table 3 , the coefficient on an indicator of living in an MSA shows that, ceteris paribus, those who live in an MSA are more likely to use therapy.
Working more hours is associated with an individual being less likely to use therapy relative to pills conditional on age, education, wages, and demographics. Interactions of hours worked with education show that the negative relationship between hours and therapy use is the strongest for those who are less educated. Together these results suggest that there is a time cost associated with therapy and that the time cost is the highest for those who are less educated. Differences in the relationship between therapy and hours worked may be a reflection of low-skilled workers having less flexible work schedules than high-skilled workers who work the same number of hours. A simple correlation of hourly wages or income with therapy use or pill use indicates that those with higher wages or income are more likely to use either treatment. However, the results from the multinomial logit show that, ceteris paribus, high wage individuals are less likely to use therapy than pills. This further suggests that therapy has a time cost, which leads to therapy having a higher opportunity cost for those with high wages (relative to an individual with low wages that loses the same amount of work time from attending therapy).
The Effects of Therapy on Time at Work
Adding to the results shown in Table 5 , we further explore the relationship between hours worked and employment, therapy use, and level of education. The left side of Table 6 presents results from two regression of hours worked. The first includes number of sessions attended and interactions of sessions with level of education. The second includes an indicator of using therapy and interactions of this indicator with level of education. The models condition on subjective mental health, an indicator of living in an MSA, geographic region, hourly wages, and demographic characteristics. The results from both models suggest that using therapy is associated with fewer hours worked and that this association is the strongest for those with low levels of education. These results also provide interpretable magnitudes. Each therapy session attended is associated with 0.24 fewer hours per week for those with a college degree, 0.28 fewer hours per week for those with some college, 0.34 fewer hours per week for those with a high school degree, and 0.58 fewer hours per week for those with less than a high school degree.
9 Looking at only the extensive margin, attending therapy is associated with 0.86 fewer hours per week for those with a college degree, 0.87 fewer hours per week for those with some college, 1.93 fewer hours per week for those with a high school degree, and 4.94 fewer hours per week for those with less than a high school degree.
If attending therapy forces individuals to miss time from work, then there is an additional group of individuals who must be taken account of: those who are not able to hold a job and attend therapy at the same time. That is, some individuals may have to choose between holding a job and attending therapy. The right side of Table 6 presents results from a linear probability model with employment as the dependent variable and therapy use and interactions with education as explanatory variables. The results indicate that attending therapy sessions is associated with a significantly lower probability of employment and that the effects are larger for those with less than a college degree than for those with a college degree.
Mental Health Production
An individual's desire to improve her mental health status is a key motivator for consuming treatment. The extent to which various treatments actually improve mental health is an empirical question. Table 7 contains results from an ordered logit model where self-reported mental health status is regressed on lagged mental health, mental health treatment variables, demographic characteristics, and state and time fixed effects. The results suggest that both therapy and pills worsen mental health -a likely indicator of selection bias. As seen in Table  4 , individuals in the worst mental health states are most likely to consume medical care. Controlling for lagged mental health does not correct this problem because while mental health is reported at each interview (on average 5-6 months apart), treatment is consumed between interviews. Thus, an individual may receive a negative health shock between the two interview periods, which leads them to both (i) consume medical care and (ii) end up in a worse mental health state. Controlling for this type of selection is a key challenge in our paper, as well as many others (Lu, 1999; Blau and Gilleskie, 2008; Cronin, 2016) . Ultimately, we solve the selection problem using an instrumental variables approach, which is discussed in Section 4.3.2.
Defining Therapist Mismatch
One striking feature of the data is that there is a large mass of individuals who attend therapy only once for an extended period of time. As will be shown in Section 4.4, these visits do not appear to have productive effects on mental health in the next period. Unfortunately, we are not able to see the identity of the therapist that an individual visits. Hence, it is difficult to discern whether these stand-alone visits are a visit to a therapist that the individual has seen in the past or sees at a later time. Therefore, to define mismatch we identify those therapy visits for which the individual attends only once, had no therapy visits in the preceding two months, and no visits in the following two months.
Using the above definition of mismatch, for each six month period, we are able to determine an individual's total number of therapy sessions, total number of mismatch therapy sessions, and total number of non-mismatch therapy sessions. For any given six month period, 1.4 percent of individuals attend therapy and 0.5 percent experience a therapist mismatch. Of those who attend therapy at least once in a 6 month period, 26.5 percent experience mismatch, 75.5 percent have at least one non-mismatch session, and 1.8 percent have both. Figure 3 shows histograms for total number of therapy visits in a given six month period both including and excluding visits that fall under our definition of mismatch. The figure that includes mismatched visits has a much higher density at one visit as compared to the histogram that excludes mismatched sessions.
3 Model
This section describes a dynamic model of mental health treatment and labor market decisions. An individual decides among treatment and labor supply alternatives considering both the contemporaneous and the expected future utility associated with each alternative. Current treatment decisions impact the distribution from which mental health is drawn in the next period, while labor supply decisions determine an individual's accumulation of work experience over time. The model has a finite time horizon with discrete time periods and discrete treatment and labor supply alternatives. A period is defined as six months, and an individual makes decisions from the ages of 25 to 60, resulting in 72 total periods in which decisions are made. In the terminal period, T , the individual receives a continuation value that depends on her terminal mental health and human capital.
The timing within a period is summarized in the figure below. Entering period t, the individual observes her state vector, Ω t , which consists of current mental health state, education, work experience, demographic characteristics, including age, race, and sex, and characteristics of the county and state of residence. Before making her decision, the individual also observes a draw from her distribution of hourly wage offers, w t . Given this information, she decides whether or not to use medication, r t , and/or talk therapy, c t , and also whether to work full time (e t = 2), part time (e t = 1), or not at all (e t = 0). If talk therapy is chosen, she later realizes whether or not she drew an unproductive match with a therapist, Φ t (Ω t ). Conditional on realizing a productive match (Φ t = 0), she receives a draw that determines the prescribed intensity of therapy, n c t .
11 Given her decisions and the realizations of Φ t and n c t , she receives flow utility, U rce . Lastly, the state vector updates and a new period begins. Whenever an individual chooses to attend talk therapy, she has some probability of mismatch. If an individual experiences mismatch, she attends one session of therapy and must pay the associated pecuniary and time costs, but the session has no productive effects on her mental health. Φ t is an indicator of whether or not the individual mismatches:
The probability of mismatch, P (Φ t = 1|Ω t ), is modeled using a logistic function that is a function of education, age, race, and sex.
If an individual chooses to go to therapy and does not mismatch, then her prescribed intensity of therapy visits, n c t , is realized. In the current specification, the individual attends therapy with either high intensity (n c t = 1) or low intensity (n c t = 0).
12 Intensity is also determined by a logistic function that is a function of education, age, race, and sex.
It is noted that there are two possible extensions to the current way in which we model therapy sessions. A first extension would be to endogenize the intensity decision. After the mismatch draw is realized, we could allow individuals to choose whether to attend with high or low intensity. A second extension would be to allow intensity to take on more than two values. For example, the most flexible model would allow individuals to choose any integer number of sessions.
13 Endogenizing intensity would allow for another margin that could be affected in policy simulations. Making intensity less discrete could reduce measurement error in the time and pecuniary costs being faced by a given individual. Future versions of this paper may incorporate one or both of these extensions.
State Vector and State Transitions
Human capital updates deterministically. Part time and full time experience, K 2,t and K 3,t , have an initial value of zero and increase by one each period that the individual decides to be employed in the respective market. Education, K 1,t , is predetermined entering the first period. Possible education levels are:
1 less than high school 2 high school 3 some college 4 college or more
Mental health takes on one of five values:
t+1 is a latent, continuous measure of mental health that depends on an individual's treatment choices in period t, her level of education, demographic characteristics, and whether or not a therapist mismatch occurs. The latent variable M * t+1 takes the following form:
(1) where D t is a vector that includes age, race, and sex. Consumption of medication (through δ 2 ) and therapy sessions (through δ 3 and δ 4 ) has direct productive effects on mental health. We assume that M t is Type 1 Extreme Value, which results in an ordered logistic structure for the probabilities of observing each level of perceived mental health.
Preferences
U rce is the flow utility associated with the alternatives r t = r, c t = c, and e t = e. Preference shocks associated with each of the twelve combinations of r t , c t , and e t , denoted rce t , are realized at the beginning of each period. 
C t represents consumption of a composite good which is determined by the budget constraint, described below, and θ is a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter. The CRRA form for the utility function allows for the pecuniary costs of therapy visits and lost income due to time costs to have different effects on utility across the consumption distribution. Preference parameters on prescription drug use, α 0 , and talk therapy use, α 1 , capture preferences for these treatment alternatives net of budget and time costs. Mental health directly impacts the current period flow utility via α 2 and α 3 . Leisure preferences are captured by α allow for employment to result in more disutility as mental health worsens; these effects of poor mental health on the desirability of being employed are one of the primary costs of poor mental health in the model.
Budget and Time Constraint
Consumption in a period is constrained as follows:
where λ is the share of family income the individual consumes, w t is the hourly wage offer, h t is weekly hours worked, y t is other family income, δ 1 is the price of medication, and δ 2 is the price for one therapy session.
14 Individuals who mismatch pay the monetary price for one session. N low and N high are the number of sessions associated with low and high intensities of therapy treatment, respectively. Weekly earnings are multiplied by 26 because there are 26 weeks in each 6 month period.
Hourly wage offers are drawn from a log-normal distribution that depends on education, part time and full time work experience, current mental health, and demographic character-istics, including age, race, and sex:
Other family income is modeled as an exogenous, stochastic process that depends on an individual's education and demographic characteristics:
Weekly hours worked are determined by the following time constraint:
Individuals who work part time have a base of 20 hours per week, while those who work full time have a base of 40 hours. The parameters λ 0 through λ 3 represent the time costs of therapy sessions. Those who choose therapy but mismatch lose the amount of time associated with attending one therapy session. The time costs of medication are normalized to zero. All employed individuals lose some work time from using therapy. However, interactions with level of education allow for these time costs to vary across education level. These interactions are used to proxy for differences in work flexibility for low-skilled and high-skilled jobs, and are motivated by the results presented in subsections 2.2 and 2.3.
The Optimization Problem
The individual's objective is to maximize her expected discounted lifetime utility. The individual makes decisions for T periods and then receives the terminal value V f , which includes second degree polynomials of terminal mental health, terminal part time experience, and terminal full time experience. Let V rce (· t ) denote the expected lifetime utility associated with choosing alternative r t = r, c t = c, and e t = e at the beginning of time t. V rce (· t ) can be written recursively as the sum of contemporaneous utility and expected future utility associated with that alternative:
When making her decision, the individual must integrate over the distribution of Φ t , the distribution of n c t , the distribution of M t+1 , and the distribution of future wage offers to calculate expected future utility. β is the discount factor. V (Ω t+1 , w t+1 ) is the expected maximal V rce (· t+1 ), where the expectation is over rce t+1 :
The model can be solved using backwards recursion. Starting in the terminal period, the individual can calculate the deterministic value function associated with each combination of r t , c t , and e t for each possible state. Taking expectations over rce t allows her to calculate V (Ω T ) for each Ω T . The collection of V (Ω T ) allows her to calculate continuation payoffs for any combination of r, c, and e in period T − 1 for any state. Hence, she can make the same calculations for T − 1 and continue working backwards to the first period. The econometrician can solve the model in a similar manner for choice probabilities associated with each time period and state, as discussed below, which can then be matched to the choices observed in the data.
Estimation
The structural parameters of the dynamic model are estimated using a nested algorithm. In an inner algorithm, the model is solved using backwards recursion at a given set of pa-rameters. The outer algorithm uses the model solution to calculate the likelihood function (below) and updates the parameter vector using the Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974) (BHHH) algorithm. We estimate 30 parameters using this nested algorithm: 9 preference parameters, the CRRA parameter, 14 parameters in the wage offer function, and 6 parameters in the terminal value function. As discussed in subsection 2.5 and detailed in subsection 4.3.2, the productivity of mental health treatments is identified and estimated outside of the model using geographic and time variation in mental health parity laws, nurse practitioner prescribing authority, and county-level variation in physicians and psychiatrists per capita. Currently, time costs of therapy are taken from a regression of hours worked on therapy sessions detailed in subsection 2.4. The probability of mismatch and therapy intensity are likewise estimated outside of the model using logit models.
Human capital approximation
Recall that the MEPS surveys individuals at different points in the life-cycle, and each individual is followed for two years. MEPS does not include questions about work history, which means that part-time and full-time work experience are not observed. Solving the model requires calculating the expected maximal value function (equation 6) for each point in the state space. Hence, it is necessary to approximate work experience for each individual in our sample.
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To approximate an individual's work experience we first calculate the proportion of the sample at each age, sex, and level of subjective mental health that is working part-time, the proportion that is working full-time, and the proportion that is not working. Using these proportions as the probability of working part-time or full-time given an age, sex, and level of mental health, we simulate an employment status for each age from 22 to 65 for each individual. The simulated work history allows us to calculate part-time and full-time experience entering the first period for each individual in the sample. Figure 3 depicts the simulated part-time and full-time experience profiles for the sample by level of subjective mental health. The figure shows that, using the approximation method, there is a considerable gap in the accumulation of full-time experience across levels of mental health. By age 40, those with poor mental health have approximately five fewer years of full-time experience on average than those with excellent mental health. Differences in part time experience are not as substantial. It is possible that those with poor mental health substitute part-time work for full-time work in some cases. Late in the life-cycle it does appear that those with worse mental health have accumulated slightly less part-time experience.
Likelihood function
In each time period, an individual's contribution to the likelihood function includes the probability of her observed choice of treatment alternatives and labor supply given her state and a set of parameters. Individuals who are working also contribute through their observed wage.
The time-varying preference shock rce t is assumed to be distributed Type I Extreme Value, which results in the expected maximal value function, V (Ω t+1 , w t+1 ), taking the following closed form:
where γ is Euler's constant and V rce (Ω t+1 , w t+1 ) is the deterministic portion of the alternative specific value function, V rce (Ω t+1 , w t+1 , rce t+1 ). The assumption of a Type I Extreme Value and additively separable preference shock also yields the following choice probabilities:
As it is assumed that individuals observe a wage offer each period, the probability of choosing any combination of r t , c t , and e t must be integrated over the distribution of wage offers for those who are not working. It is also necessary to integrate over the distribution of future wage offers and future amounts of other family income to calculate expected future utility. All of these integrations are simulated using 25 draws from a Halton sequence.
Let the indicator d
rce t take a value of one whenever r t = r, c t = c, and e t = e, and zero otherwise. Also let f w represent the probability density function for the disitribution of wage offers. Then, for individual i in time period t, the likelihood contribution at a set of parameters Θ is:
(11)
Identification
The term identification is used frequently to describe two different econometric concepts. Traditionally, a model was said to be "identified" if the data and model were such that a unique set of parameters maximized the objective function. The OLS corollary is the rank condition, which allows for the inversion of the X X matrix. More recently, researchers have begun describing a particular treatment effect as "identified" if the variation in the causal variable used in estimation is uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of the outcome variable. The OLS corollary is the exogeneity condition, or that E[ X] = 0. In the following two subsections, we separately discuss each of these concepts in relation to the model described in Section 3.
Uniqueness of Structural Parameters
The likelihood function consists of choice probabilities for combinations of employment (e t ), medication (r t ), and therapy (c t ), as well as contributions from observed wages. Preference parameters found in Equation (2) only impact the likelihood function through impacts on choice probabilities. Hence, the estimation procedure will find the preference parameters that make the choice probabilities generated by the model most closely match the choice probabilities observed in the data. For example, preferences for treatment (α 0 , α 1,0 , α 1,1 ) are identified based on the popularity of treatment choices given their productivity levels and given their costs in terms of time and money. The preference for mental health (α 2 ) is identified by variation in the degree to which individuals are willing to consume costly treatments across the distribution of mental health states. 17 Preferences for employment are identified by the popularity of working part-time and full-time given the amount of income that the model predicts for these types of employment and preferences for consumption of income (determined by the CRRA parameter). Because treatment alternatives have a pecuniary cost, the CRRA parameter is identified by variation in treatment choices across the income distribution.
We jointly model the wage offer distribution and selection into employment. Hence, we identify the full distribution of wage offers rather than only the distribution of accepted offers. Currently, family income serves as an exclusion restriction that impacts the decision to work, but not one's own wage distribution conditional on education, work experience, and demographic characteristics. In the future, other family characteristics could enter the model, such as number of children, that impact the decision to work but do not impact wages directly.
Causal Identification
Our model allows two potential motives for medical care consumption -a preference motive (i.e., individuals simply enjoy consuming care) or a productive motive (i.e., medical care improves mental health, which individuals prefer). The relative importance of these motives is estimated from the data. As is discussed in Section 2.5, selection into treatment by sick individuals will lead the production function parameters measuring the efficacy/productivity of treatment, (δ 2 , δ 3 , δ 4 , δ 5 ), to be biased. Our current solution for this problem is to estimate the production function parameters from Equation 1 outside the model, while employing an instrumental variables technique. The parameters from this estimation as then use to determine (conditional) mental health transition probabilities within the model. The method is similar to that used in Rust (1987) .
We use three sets of instruments. The first set measures the status of mental health parity legislation in the individual's state of residence. Between 1996 and 2008, 40 states passed laws requiring that private providers of health insurance cover mental health treatments "at parity" with physical health treatments. For affected individuals, changes in these laws should reduce the out-of-pocket cost of therapy and psychotherapeutic drugs, increasing use. We measure the status of this legislation using three binary variables -full parity, partial parity, and parity if offered.
18 Other papers have studied the effect of these laws on mental health outcomes (Klick and Markowitz, 2006; Lang, 2013; Ronda, 2016) , treatment decisions (Goldman et al., 2006; Busch and Barry, 2008) , and labor market outcomes (Hockenberry and Wen, 2016) . To our knowledge, we are the first to identify the effect mental health treatment on self-reported mental health status using parity laws as instruments. The second set of instruments measures the status of legislation on nurse practitioner prescribing abilities in the individual's state of residence. Since 1998, 11 states have passed laws giving nurse practitioners more freedom in treating patients. These laws are thought to have particularly strong effects on medical care consumption in rural areas, where doctors are scarce (Alexander and Schnell, 2016). We measure the status of this legislation using two binary variables -the state allows independent practice and full prescribing authority and the state allows independent practice, but prescription writing requires doctor supervision. The third set 18 Full parity indicates that the insurer (i) must provide coverage for mental health services and (ii) the the cost sharing terms must equal those for physical heath services. Partial parity indicates that the state has mandated limits on the cost sharing terms private plans must offer for mental health services. Parity if offered indicates that the insurer must offer cost sharing terms for mental health services that are equal to those for physical health services if mental health coverage is provide at all. of instruments measures the number of medical doctors and psychiatrists per capita in the individuals county of residence. This information has been is collected by the Department of Health and Human Services as part of the Area Health Resource File (AHRF) every year since 1995.
In total, we have seven instruments and four endogenous, binary variables -any prescription drugs consumed, high volume therapy user, low volume therapy user, and experienced therapy mismatch -thus, our mental health production model is over identified. We estimate the model using a two-step control function approach. The first step consists of four linear probability models, one for each endogenous variable. The right hand side variables include the seven instruments, demographic characteristics, and state and time fixed effects. The second step mental health production function is estimated via ordered logit (Equation 1). Predicted residuals from the first stage are included in the second stage to control for endogenous selection.
19 Our key identifying assumptions are that (i) the instruments have a significant effect on individual treatment decisions (i.e., that the instruments aren't weak ) and (ii) that the instruments only effect an individuals mental health status through their effect on treatment (i.e., that the instruments are exogenous).
Parameter Estimates
Preliminary estimates of the model parameters are presented in Tables 7, 9 , 10, and 11. Table 7 contains parameters from the mental health production function without (Model 1) and with (Model 2) instruments. 20 The first four rows of Table 7 show that our instrumental variables technique has the desired effect. Both pills and therapy are found to be effective in improving an individual's mental health. Moreover, consistent with the medical literature cited above, pills are found to improve mental health by a small and insignificant effect. Therapy is found to have a large and significant impact on mental health, which is increasing in the amount of therapy consumed. Finally, mismatched therapy sessions are found to have 19 The authors are aware that this technique is not quite right. The Rivers and Vuong (1988) control function procedure that we imitate requires an assumption that first-stage errors are homoskedastic and normally distributed. Because our first-stage dependent variables are binary, this assumption is violated. Eventually, we will estimate this production function via joint MLE with correlated errors, which is suggested by Imbens and Wooldridge (2007) . However, it is worth noting that when we estimate the existing model by 2SLS (i.e., we simply force the non-linear second-stage dependent variable into a linear model), a procedure that should produce consistent (though inefficient) estimates, our findings are largely the same.
20 First stage parameters are provided in Table 8 . Note that the effect of the instruments on treatment decisions is quite intuitive. The mental health parity laws lead to significantly more pill and therapy consumption. The legislation allowing nurse practitioners to practice with more independence also leads to significantly more pill and (high) therapy consumption. More doctors per capital increase pill consumption, (low) therapy consumption, and therapy mismatch. More psychiatrists have nearly the opposite effect, decreasing pill usage, (low) therapy usage, and mismatch while increasing (high) therapy usage. a negative, though statistically insignificant, effect on mental health, which further validates our decision to model mismatches as a potential cost associated with consuming therapy.
Preference parameter estimates are found in Table 9 . Negative coefficients on both high and low levels of therapy consumption suggest that there are unobserved costs to therapy that are not being captured by the model, which accounts for uncertainty, time, and monetary costs. Likewise, the negative coefficient on consumption of medication suggests that there are costs of using medication beyond the monetary costs. Individuals receive positive flow utility from good mental health that is marginally diminishing. Individuals receive disutility from working, which rationalizes the large portion of the sample (24 percent) that chooses not work. Better mental health makes both part time and full time work relatively more attractive. These estimates suggest that the impacts of poor mental health on employment could reduce income contemporaneously by causing an individual to be less likely to work as well as income in the future by reducing the accumulation of human capital. Table 10 shows wage offer parameters. As expected, wages are increasing in education, accumulated part time and full time work experience, and better mental health. 
Counterfactual Policy Simulations
We conduct two counterfactual policy simulations. In the first, the price of therapy is reduced to zero; in the second, the time cost of therapy is reduced to zero. Currently, the simulations are within sample simulations. That is, they are performed for 14,981 individuals whose initial characteristics (age, mental health, sex, race, and education) match those of the 14,981 individuals in the sample. Decisions and outcomes are simulated for 3 decision periods to match the amount of time that individuals are observed in the sample. The effect of the two counterfactual policies on treatment choices, mental health outcomes, and wage offers can be seen in Tables 12 and 13.   According to Table 12 , reducing the price of therapy increases therapy use by 43% and pill use by about 1%, the latter of which is due to income effects. The largest increases are observed for individuals in the lowest two education categories -high school graduates and drop outs. This result is intuitive -according to the model, low education individuals, who also tend to be low income, are relatively more price sensitive due to the estimated decreasing returns to income/consumption. We also find that reducing the time cost of therapy increases therapy consumption by about 11% and increases pill consumption by a little under 2%. Again, the largest increases in therapy consumption are observed for the lowest education group, who face the highest time costs at baseline. Table 13 reports changes in mental health and wages, by education level, among those altering their therapy decisions due to the policies. For the zero price simulation, improvements in mental health range from 33-13% with the largest improvements observed for individuals with the lowest levels of education. The correlation between education and mental health improvement is consistent with low education individuals having lower (average) baseline mental health levels. Wage improvements range from 24-12% and are similarly correlated with education, which is expected, as the primary mechanism by which wages improve due to greater therapy consumption is through improved mental health.
22 When time costs are reduced to zero, mental health improvements range from 25-13%, with the magnitude of the change again negatively correlated with education. Interestingly, among the lowest three education categories, the baseline wages of those altering their therapy behavior due to a reduction in the time costs are higher than those influenced by the reduction in price. This suggests that our model is capturing the importance of the opportunity cost of therapy (i.e., foregone wages), which is highest for high earning individuals.
Conclusion
This paper uses a dynamic decision-making model and data on consumer behaviors to study the complex relationship between mental health conditions, treatment alternatives, and labor market outcomes. Our primary goals, are to identify the key impediments to effective medical treatments for mental illness and to measure the health and labor market returns to policies which promote more effective treatment choices. Our findings suggest that monetary costs, time costs, uncertainty over treatment productivity, and preferences together explain the lack of demand for psychotherapy relative pills. Counterfactual simulations are used to show that lower monetary and time costs to therapy would significantly increase therapy use, as well as mental health outcomes and wages. Moreover, individuals with the lowest reported levels of education would benefit the most from these policies, reducing both treatment and income inequalities observed in the data.
Our current analysis has several limitations. First, we use average medical care prices that do not vary by individual and that are unrelated to insurance status. In our data, we observed individual-level medical care prices as well as insurance status, so this variation can be integrated into the consumers optimization problem. Second, our current model is not sufficiently flexible across individuals' ages to allow for simulations over the life-cycle. Third, because individuals enter our data at different ages and we do not observe work history, we must impute their accumulated work experience, which is likely to be correlated with their mental health. Our current imputation is described in Section 4.1. This technique produces variation in entering work history by entering mental health status, but does not account for the evolution of mental health over the life-cycle to affect accumulated experience. Addressing these three limitations will be the focus of our work moving forward. Notes: Total observations across all age bins is 1,338,781 over the years 1996 to 2012. "Perceived MH" is the respondent's subjective assessment of own mental health and ranges from 1 (poor) to 5 (excellent). Depression and anxiety indicators are based on the ICD-9 codes associated with reported diagnoses. Notes: The sample is restricted to those who are at least 22 years old and report a mental health condition. For hours worked, the model is restricted to those working positive hours. The model conditions on subjective mental health, sex, age, race, geographic region, hourly wages, marital status, and family size. 
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